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Abstract
We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signalling game
and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often
built into the framework. In particular, we explore realistic asymmetries
that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing
receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the
likelihood of signalling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often
has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this paper can also
help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence
of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict of
interest signalling games.
1 Signalling games and evolution
Common interest signalling games were introduced by David Lewis (Lewis,
1969) as part of a game theoretic framework which identified communicative
conventions as the expected solutions to coordination problems. In recent years,
this has informed a growing body of work on the evolution of communication,
incorporating signalling games into an evolutionary game theoretic approach to
modelling the evolution of communication and cooperation in humans (Skyrms,
2010; Skyrms, 1996).
As the basis for game theoretic modelling of such phenomena, David Lewis
signalling games are attractive in their intuitive simplicity and clear outcomes.
They are coordination games of common interest between world-observing senders
and action-making receivers using costless signals; in contrast to games where
interests may differ and where costly signals are typically invoked. In the stan-
dard two-player, two-state, two-option David Lewis signalling game (hereafter
the ‘2x2x2 game’), the first agent (signaller) observes that the world is in one of
two possible states (state1 or state2) and broadcasts one of two possible signals
(signal1 or signal2) which are observed by the second agent (receiver) who per-
forms one of two possible actions (act1 or act2). If the acts match the state of
the world (i.e. act1 if state1 or act2 if state2) then the players receive a greater
payoff than otherwise.
Most importantly, though, the game theoretic results are unequivocal. There
exist two Nash equilibria that are, in Lewis’s words, signalling systems where
senders condition otherwise arbitrary signalling behaviour on the state of the
world, and receivers act on those signals to secure the mutual payoff. The two
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systems only differ on which signal gets to be associated with each state of the
world1. Huttegger (2007) and Pawlowitsch (2008) have shown that under certain
conditions a signalling systems is guaranteed to emerge under the replicator
dynamics, a standard model of evolution to be discussed further in section 4.
Of course the degree to which Lewis’ approach makes sense is the degree
to which we have confidence in the interpretation and application of such a
highly idealised model to the more complex target systems. The obvious worry
is that by introducing more realistic features into the model one might break or
significantly dilute previous findings on the evolution of signalling.
Not surprisingly, then, recent work on Lewis signalling games has investi-
gated the many ways in which such de-idealizations could occur. Some devia-
tions from the standard Lewis signalling game include: more and varied states
of the world, the possibility of observational error or signal error, noisy signals,
partial deviation in interest between senders and receivers, the reception of more
than one signal, and so on. Many such concerns are dealt with favourably in
Skyrms (2010), and in work by others. For example Bruner et al. (2014) gen-
eralizes beyond the 2x2x2 case and Godfrey-Smith and Martinez (2013) and
Godfrey-Smith (2015) mix signalling games of common interest and conflict of
interest. One complication of the Lewis signalling game (particularly important
for our purposes) is that signalling systems are not guaranteed in the simple
2x2x2 case when the world is biased. In other words, when the probabilities
of the world being in state1 or state2 are not equal, a pooling equilibrium in
which no communication occurs between sender and receiver is evolutionarily
possible.
2 Symmetry breaking
The focus here will be with the idealisation that sender and receiver are equally
responsive in strategic settings. Senders and receivers (in the evolutionary treat-
ment of such games) are two populations of highly abstract and constrained
agency roles: all that signallers do on observing the state of the world is send a
signal, and the receivers must act as though the world is in one or other of the
sender-observable states. Of those two roles, it is the restriction on receivers
which is the more problematic.
Imagine for example a forager sighting a prey animal at a location inaccessi-
ble to her, but close enough to be acquired by an allied conspecific (who cannot
observe the animal). In this case, it is easy for the first forager to slip into
the signalling role and execute it, whistling or gesturing to her counterpart. To
play the receiver role, however, the second forager has to actually re-orient their
attention (to some degree) and attempt to engage in appropriate behaviour for
the world-state the first has observed (e.g. prey is to the east or to the west,
etc.).
The Lewis signalling model by design is constrained such that the receiver’s
actions are limited to just those acts associated with the sender’s observed
world-states. It is of course sensible to begin inquiry with as simple of a model
as possible and consider a limited range of responses to stimuli. However, our
point is that it is more plausible to make these idealizations for signallers than
1The other two possible outcomes of the game are ‘pooling equilibrium’, where the receiver
plays act1 or act2 unconditionally.
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for receivers. Signals are (by stipulation) cheap and easy to send, yet the actions
available to the receiver are less plausibly interpreted as intrinsically cheap and
free of opportunity cost.
In addition, the informational states drawn on by sender and receiver are
also likely to be very different. Any real-life sender’s observation of a world state
will likely inform their motivations (‘we should catch that animal’) to dictate a
fairly clear course of action (‘try to direct the other agent’s behaviour’). But
all the receiver gets is a whistle, gesture or other signal which (by stipulation)
has no pre-established meaning. The experience of observing a strategically rel-
evant state of the world will typically be richer and more detailed than that of
observing a strategically relevant artificial signal. All this leads to two concerns.
Firstly, asymmetries in the strategic situations are likely to exist between senders
and receivers. Receivers are likely to have locally reasonable options available
to them other than those relevant to signaller-observed states of the world, and
their responsiveness to the strategic situation is therefore less satisfactorily mod-
elled by the strictly symmetric payoff structures of standard signalling games.
Call this the structural responsiveness concern.
Secondly, given the likely differences in informational states, goal-directness,
workload and opportunity cost implications of sender and receiver roles, we
can expect the mechanisms (cognitive and otherwise) which instantiate them to
differ as well, quantitatively and qualitatively. This implies that we should not
expect their update-responsiveness in any given game to be equal either. Yet
the working evolutionary assumption is that senders and receivers update their
strategies in an identical manner, modelled using either learning dynamics or
replicator dynamics. Call this the evolutionary responsiveness concern.
3 Hedgehog strategies and update asymmetry
The first of these concerns might sound like an argument for abandoning co-
ordination games and moving toward ‘conflict of interest’ or ‘partial conflict of
interest’ models. However the issue is more specific than this.
The structural responsiveness concern provides parallel motivation to one of
Kim Sterelny’s (Sterelny, 2012) concerns about Skyrms (2010) use of the Lewis
model. Sterelny asks whether the availability of ‘third options’ on the part of
the receiver might undermine the evolution of signalling even when these third
options are less valuable than the payoff for successful coordination. As part of
a discussion of animal threat responses, he labels this a ‘hedgehog’ strategy –
taking an action which pays off modestly, regardless of the state of the world.
To make this concrete, hedgehogs often roll into a ball in response to predators.
This is a stark contrast to the more sophisticated behaviour of vervets, who
have specific responses to specific threats. Yet the optimal response a vervet
takes to one threat – climb a tree when confronted by a leopard – may lead
to total disaster when used in response to another threat, such as an eagle.
Hedgehogs avoid such outcomes by ‘hedging’ unconditionally so as to secure a
modest payoff. Translated to signalling games, such a gambit may, in many
cases, be more attractive than attempting to respond optimally to a signal2.
2It is worth noting here that the ‘hedgehog’ strategy in this Lewis signalling game is in
many ways analogous to the risk dominant ‘hare’ response in stag hunt games. Playing
hare instead of stag allows the agent to avoid disaster, but only guarantees the individual a
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This compliments the structural responsiveness concern: receivers (espe-
cially) might have other options of value which will stand in competition to
those assumed in the standard signalling game. Something like these hedgehog
strategies are plausible departures from the idealisation and should be expected
on the part of the receiver given a realistic demandingness of the role. The
question is whether (as Sterelny suspects) including hedgehog strategies might
undermine the robustness of evolution toward signalling systems.
Our second concern pertaining to evolutionary responsiveness parallels a
well-known evolutionary hypothesis: the so-called Red Queen effect. In com-
petitive relationships such as predator-prey or parasite-host, the Red Queen
hypothesis states that species will be constantly adapting and evolving in re-
sponse to one another just to “stay in the same place” (Van Valen, 1973). This
should also be the case in competitive signalling situations – such as predator-
prey signalling systems or courtship displays among conspecifics. Signallers and
receivers come to not just update their strategies, but to do so at faster or slower
rates depending on the nature of the strategic encounter they are entwined in3.
It might seem that in David Lewis signalling games (as with games of com-
mon interest in general) the Red Queen effect should have no role to play. How-
ever any realistic interpretation of the Lewis signalling game makes it plausible
to consider asymmetry in evolutionary responsiveness as likely, if not the norm.
First, as argued, the precise cognitive mechanisms and procedures employed by
senders and receivers are likely to be different. Different systems will admit to
different degrees of plasticity and evolvability – and will have a different set of
cross-cutting tasks and utilities that will place their own demands upon them.
Quick and easy signalling responses will have different pathways of update and
adaptation than the (typically) more complex set of systems which appropriate
receiver responses require.
The consideration of multiple use or adaptive reuse also makes the Red
Queen hypothesis salient: it is wildly implausible that entirely separate cog-
nitive systems would evolve to deal with competitive signalling situations and
coordination-style situations. Cognitive structures which underpin sender or
receiver behaviour will likely be subject to evolutionary pressures from compet-
itive as well as cooperative situations, and the responsive nimbleness of sender
and receiver strategies is therefore not guaranteed to be the same. We should
not assume that the evolution of sender and receiver strategies always proceeds
at the same pace.
Finally, there is at least some evidence of a basic asymmetry between sender
and receiver roles in the literature on great ape communication. For example,
Hobaiter and Byrne (2014) stress the great sophistication and flexibility on the
receiver side of Chimpanzee gestural communication, while Seyfarth and Cheney
(2003) discuss about how greater inferential sophistication on the receiver side
is a feature of many primate communication systems. While these findings do
mediocre payoff. Thus the issues and trade-offs associated with the hedgehog strategy are
general concerns not confined to just the Lewis signalling games. Thanks to [name redacted
for review] for helping us better see this connection.
3An example of two groups adapting and evolving at different rates can be found in Richard
Dawkin’s discussion of his famous Life-Dinner principle (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979). While
we expect both predator and prey to adapt to each other, Dawkins claims the prey species
will come to evolve at a faster rate than the predator species due to the different selection
pressures exerted on both species. Failing to adapt quickly enough for the predator means
going hungry for an extra day, while failing to adapt for the prey means death.
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not directly support the structural and evolutionary responsiveness concerns,
they show that real-life sender and receiver strategies (in our near biological
cousins at least) exhibit important differences, suggesting cognitive asymmetries
compatible with those concerns.
In summary then, there is reason to consider two structural modifications
to the Lewis signalling game as especially salient to the issue of responsiveness:
the addition of ‘hedgehog’ strategies for receivers, and differing rates of change
in sender and receiver strategies.
4 The model
The evolutionary model we use as a basis for our analysis is the pure-strategy
2x2x2 David Lewis signalling game, with the two-population discrete-time repli-
cator dynamics.
Exact components of the model include two states of the world (L and R),
a world-observing signaller with two possible signals (V1 and V2), and a signal-
observing receiver with two possible actions (AL and AR). If the receiver’s action
matches the state of the world, then both signaller and receiver get a fixed
positive success payoff, otherwise their payoff is zero. Signallers and receivers
both have four pure strategies available to them (see table 1).
S1 Signal V1 if L and signal V2 if R
S2 Signal V2 if L and signal V1 if R
S3 Signal V1 always
S4 Signal V2 always
S5 Act AL if V1 and act AR if V2
S6 Act AR if V1 and act AL if V2
S7 Act AL always
S8 Act AR always
Table 1: Signaller and receiver strategies in the standard 2x2x2 common interest
signalling game.
For the evolutionary model, the proportions of the different strategies within
sender and receiver populations are initially randomly generated. The fitness
of each strategy at a time period t is determined by the composition of the
opposing population and the payoff associated with each strategy pairing. The
proportion of each strategy at play in the next time period t + 1 is determined
by the standard discrete-time replicator dynamics. For the sender population
this is:
Xi(t + 1) = Xi(t)
Fi
FS
where Xi is the ith sender strategy, Fi is the fitness of that strategy and FS
is the average sender strategy fitness. Likewise, for receivers:
Yj(t + 1) = Yj(t)
Fj
FR
where Yj is the jth sender strategy, Fj is the fitness of that strategy and FR is
the average receiver strategy fitness. This is repeated until the populations settle
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into an evolutionarily stable arrangement. The update process is deterministic
and no randomising or mutations are allowed.
5 Modifications and results
We introduce two novel modifications to this model. First, we add a ‘hedgehog’
action AH for the receiver. Second, we allow the rate of generational change
of senders and receivers to vary relative to one other. In addition, the bias of
nature is also varied, and we investigate the effects these three departures from
the Skyrms/Lewis idealisation have on the evolutionary stability of signalling
equilibria.
Turning to our first modification, the receiver now has three possible actions
upon observing the signal: AL, AR, and AH . As before a success payoff of 1 is
received by both players in the case that the receiver plays AL while the world
is in state L, or the receiver plays AR while the world is in state R. A payoff
of zero is received if AL or AR is played otherwise. A payoff of H is received
unconditionally if the receiver plays AH , where the value of H is between 0 and
1. The sender has four familiar pure strategies, whereas the receiver now has
five (for simplicity we omit conditional strategies involving AH).
To adapt the earlier forager story, we can imagine the sender and receiver
as an egalitarian hunting party, and the game as a situation where the sender
remotely observes the location of a valuable prey animal (left or right) and calls
out to the receiver. The receiver is initially unable to observe the prey but
can choose to go left or go right (catching the prey if they go in the matching
direction), or alternatively to abandon the hunt in order to obtain a less valu-
able resource they do not need help from the sender to acquire (the hedgehog
strategy). Varying the prior probability of the world is equivalent to it being in
a situation where it is systematically more likely that the prey is to the left or
the right.
In the simple unbiased 2x2x2 signalling game, one of the two signalling
equilibria is guaranteed to be reached under the replicator dynamics. In our
notation, these equilibria are S1-R1 and S2-R2. Increasing the bias of the world
(i.e. making L more probable than R or vice versa) will undermine this, with
an increasing proportion of populations instead collapsing to pooling equilib-
ria. This will occur when there are initially few conditional signalling strategies
in the sender population. In such situations, receivers do best to simply per-
form the act that is most appropriate for the more likely state of the world.
The incentive for senders to adopt a signalling system then disappears and the
community is locked into a pooling equilibrium.
Not surprisingly, we found a similar effect with the hedgehog strategy as
values of H, the payoff for AH , becomes significant. The hedgehog strategy R5
is an additional unilateral response, and is able to draw some initial populations
away from the signalling equilibria when H is in excess of 0.5 (i.e., the average
payoff for ‘guessing’). This result, for an unbiased world, is illustrated in Figure
14.
4Note that the exact range of this effect, including the point at which the effect becomes
significant and the y-intercept, are artefacts of the number of world-states and strategies in
the model and therefore not general.
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Figure 1: Effect of hedgehog payoff on proportion of signalling equilibria.
We observe a more surprising result when the bias and H are varied in com-
bination. Figure 2 shows the results of varying bias for different values of H. The
H = 0 curve has the expected n-shape, with perfect signalling being degraded
as world-bias increases away from the mid-point of even bias between L and R.
The inclusion of significant (i.e. H ¿ 0.5) hedgehog payoffs decreases signalling
at even bias. As nature becomes increasingly biased, however, the proportion
of simulations that head to a signalling system does not go down. In fact we
observe a ‘plateau’ followed by a gradual increase in the proportion signalling
as nature becomes increasingly biased. However, once the bias becomes too
extreme, the traditional pooling equilibrium becomes increasingly likely as the
payoff associated with simply performing the appropriate act for the more likely
state of the world approaches 1. This results in a steep decline in the proportion
of simulations that result in signalling systems.
6 Generational asymmetry
We now turn to our second modification of the David Lewis signalling framework
in which we introduce a generational asymmetry. We introduced a ‘slow-down
factor’ Z to the replicator dynamics in order control the rate at which sender and
receiver populations change over time. Composition of the sender and receiver
populations are now governed by the following equations:
Xi(t + 1) = (1− ZS)Xi(t) Fi
FS
+ Xi(t)ZS
Yj(t + 1) = (1− ZR)Yj(t) Fj
FR
+ Yj(t)ZR
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Figure 2: Effect of hedgehog strategy and bias of nature on proportion of sig-
nalling equilibria.
Note that when both ZR and ZS are zero there is no deviation from the stan-
dard replicator dynamics. Rates of changes are slowed as their values increase;
for example setting ZS = .5 halves the rate of change for sender strategies. ZR
(alone) being set to 1 means taht the composition of the receiver population
would not change over time, and only the sender population would evolve.
The result of introducing this generational asymmetry between senders and
receivers is that signalling is more likely when sender strategies evolve faster
than receiver strategies. This is illustrated in figure 3, where senders (ZS) and
receivers (ZR) are slowed down to half and one-tenth speeds (with the other
population unaltered) as the bias of nature is varied.
Slowing the evolution of the sender population leads to more pooling because,
as before, receivers facing a sender population whose conditional signalling is
low will begin to gravitate to the act that matches the more likely state of the
world (and the threshold for ‘low’ is higher at higher bias). This evolution-
ary trajectory only reverses if conditional signalling increases rapidly enough
to tip the fitness balance toward its matching conditional response, before that
response is overpowered. Thus signalling becomes quite a remote possibility
when bias is high and senders are slow, occurring in less than 10% of simula-
tions for some parameter values. Slowing the evolutionary responsiveness of the
receiver population evolves has the opposite effect – as senders will have time to
adopt the best separating strategy given the mix of receiver strategies, and the
receiver population slowly adjusts and a robust signalling system establishes.
By a similar logic, it is easy to see that a quickly evolving sender population
also mitigates against the effect of hedgehog strategies.
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Figure 3: Effect of generational asymmetry and bias of nature on proportion of
signalling equilibria.
7 Discussion
We have explored a few well-motivated departures from the highly idealized
and simple Lewis signalling game typically considered in the literature. As
shown in section 4, breaking the symmetry between senders and receivers often
significantly reduces the likelihood that a separating equilibrium emerges. For
one, providing receivers with a safe third option which allows them to secure a
decent payoff regardless of the state of the world significantly reduces the size
of the basin of attraction of the separating equilibrium. Likewise, separating is
a remote possibility when receivers outpace senders in the race to adapt.
However the interaction between hedgehog payoffs and bias shows that signalling-
undermining effects are not strictly additive. Likewise, the situation is much
less bleak when senders evolve at a faster pace than receivers. Interestingly,
many scholars in the animal communications literature have noted a similar re-
sponse asymmetry between sender and receiver in conflict of interest and partial
conflict of interest signalling games. For instance, Owren, Rendall, and Ryan
(2010) note that senders can easily adapt their signalling behaviour while re-
ceivers for the most part have responses to the stimuli produced by senders that
are more difficult to change. Thus some have taken to think of signalling as
primarily involving the manipulation of receivers by senders.
But this leaves us with an evolutionary puzzle. If there is a conflict of interest
between sender and receiver, then what prevents receivers from increasing the
speed at which they adapt to the behaviour of the senders? In other words,
what explains the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and
receiver? These are the exact circumstances we would expect the red queen
hypothesis to apply. We believe the results of this paper may form the basis of
9
a novel explanation for this puzzling phenomena. When the interests of sender
and receiver are perfectly aligned it is actually in the interest of both parties for
the sender population to ‘take the lead’ and evolve at the faster rate, as doing so
ensures the community is more likely to hit upon a mutually beneficial signalling
system. When the interests of sender and receiver significantly diverge, however,
we would expect this not to be the case since both parties now have reason to
adapt at a faster pace than the other.
Yet individuals who routinely interact rarely find themselves playing either
common interest or conflict of interest signalling games exclusively. As is well
known by any parent, not all signalling interactions between relatives are free
of conflict. Likewise, agents whose interests are typically thought to be par-
tially opposed, such as two potential mates, may frequently engage in common
interest signalling games in contexts unrelated to mating. The point is that a
variety of strategic scenarios can hold between sender and receiver, and there
is no principled reason to think all interactions will involve perfect alignment
or sizable conflict. If so, then a proportion of signalling interactions between
sender and receiver may involve no conflict, a partial conflict, or a full conflict
of interest. When the proportion of no or low conflict signalling games is sig-
nificant, the generational asymmetry result from the previous section may hold
to some degree. Both sender and receiver will then profit from the sender pop-
ulation evolving at a faster rate than the receiver population, and receivers do
best to limit how responsive they are to senders so as to ensure the emergence
of informative signalling systems when their interests do overlap. Thus, while
it may appear puzzling as to why a receiver is not more responsive when her
interests diverge from that of the sender, this confusion might be resolved when
the interaction is put into context.
The robustness analysis considered in this paper has in some sense shown
how fragile the evolution of signalling can be. Slightly altering the framework in
a sensible fashion leads to significantly different results. While many variants of
the baseline Lewis signalling game have been explored by philosophers in recent
years, more work is required in order to better assess the prospect of signalling
in realistic environments.
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